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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fact that the contract called for the abnormally high profit of two
hundred per cent."2
Nearly all of the litigation over the proper meaning of the word
"cost" in cost-plus contracts could have been prevented by careful
draftsmanship. Due to the unsettled state of the law in the area and
the relative lack of authority,2" the attorney faced with the task of
drafting such an agreement would be well advised to carefully define
the specific items intended to be covered by or excluded from "cost."
JOSEPH STEVENS FERRELL
Contracts-Indefinite Duration of Exclusive Sales Agreements-Dis-
tributor's Right to Prospective Profits for a Reasonable Time
In the recent case of General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors
Inc.,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court, by way of dictum, ap-
proved the majority view that an exclusive sales and distributors
contract, which expresses no time for its duration, will by implication
of law be considered to run for a reasonable period of time.2
The parties orally agreed that the defendant would be the sole
and exclusive distributor of plaintiff-manufacturer's product in North
and South Carolina for an indefinite period of time. Shortly there-
after, due to insufficiency of defendant's working capital, the parties
executed a written agreement, known as a "Warehouse Agreement,"
whereby the plaintiff agreed to consign goods to defendant while
retaining legal title to them. A year later this agreement was altered
by an oral modification which provided that plaintiff would continue
his consignment of goods as before for a stated period of three years,
during which time the defendant would purchase the goods by
monthly installments. Under this purchasing agreement, the de-
fendant, who was in arrears in payments, refused to surrender the
goods upon request and plaintiff brought this action to recover their
"The court quite properly held that cost was intended to include only
actual out-of-pocket expenses. Loewy v. A. Rosenthal, Inc., 104 F. Supp.
496 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
- North Carolina has never explicitly ruled on the construction of a cost-
plus contract, but in Harris & Harris v. Crain & Denbo, 256 N.C. 110, 123
S.E.2d 590 (1962), the court clearly implied they were inclined to the ma-
jority view that overhead cannot be considered part of cost.
-253 N.C. 459, 117 S.E.2d 479 (1960).
'E. I. Du Pont Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224 (8th
Cir. 1933); J. C. Millett Co. v. Park Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp.




possession. The defendant counterclaimed for $50,000 damages,
alleging that plaintiff, by demanding the goods, had breached the
distributorship contract.3 On the single issue of whether plaintiff
wrongfully took possession of the goods, the jury- found for the
plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The supreme court reversed
on other grounds,4 but further stated the modern majority rules that
a distributorship contract which expresses no time for its duration
is terminable only after it has run for a reasonable time. Previously
the majority rule had been that a principal generally had the right
to cancel at will a selling agency contract which was silent as to time,
particularly where the agency was not coupled with an interest and
the cancellation was in good faith.5 However, as the result of the
increasing number of distributor contracts and the fact that under
these contracts the agent is required to expend large sums of money
and to undertake other obligations in preparation for performance,
the courts have more recently held that the agent has a substantial
interest in the contract and therefore should not be placed at the
mercy of the manufacturer.6 Evidence of such expenses and acts of
Although the court concluded that the subsequent oral agreement of
July 1957 contemplated that the distributorship would continue as long as
thepurchasing agreement, the two contracts were in fact separate and distinct.
The trial court submitted the following single issue to the jury, "Did
the plaintiff wrongfully take its inventory from the defendant's warehouse ?"
The Supreme Court reversed on this point and said that this issue alone
would not decide the case. Before the plaintiff would be entitled to the
possession of the goods, the jury would have to find (1) that the plaintiff
was the rightful owner; (2) that the defendant had breached the "Warehouse
Agreement" as modified by the parol agreement; (3) that the defendant
refused to relinquish possession of the goods and thereby was wrongfully
retaining them.
'Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Lucker, 128 Minn. 171, 150 N.W. 790
(1915); Meyer v. Pubitizer Pub. Co., 156 Mo. App. 170, 136 S.W. 5 (1911);
Codrad v. Golden, 275 App. Div. 946, 89 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1949); Winslow v.
Mayo, 123 App. Div. 758, 108 N.Y. Supp. 640, aff'd, 195 N.Y. 551, 88
N.E. 1135 (1908) ; Price v. Confair, 366 Pa. 538, 79 A.2d 224 (1951).
'Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber Engineering Prods., 237 F.2d 879 (4th Cir.
1956); Bach v. Freedin Calculating Mach. Co., 155 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1946).
See also WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1027A (rev. ed. 1936): "[Q]uite properly
[this contract of indefinite duration] has been held an enforceable executory
contract, binding upon each party for a reasonable time. It is the settled
law of agency that if the agent or employee furnishes a consideration in
addition to his mere services, he is deemed to have purchased the employ-
ment for at least a reasonable time where the duration of the employment is
not otherwise defined. A similar result should be reached though the dealer
is a buyer-distributor rather than a technical agent, where in addition to
undertaking to pay for the manufacturer's products as ordered, he promises
to establish or maintain adequate sales and demonstration facilities or to
provide a maintenance and repair service for handling said products."
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preparation create an inference that a definite or reasonable period
of employment was actually contemplated.' The majority view today
is that a contract which calls for continual performance or additional
expenditures by the agents or distributor and which makes no refer-
ence to its duration is to run for a reasonable time.'
Until the principal case, North Carolina has had only two occa-
sions to decide this questions and on both occasions has held, con-
trary to the modern majority rule, that these exclusive sales con-
tracts were terminable at will.9  However, with the dictum in the
principal case, it would appear that the old rules has been abrogated
and North Carolina has adopted the majority rule.
The court in the principal case also indicated that where a dis-
tributorship agreement of indefinite duration is breached by the manu-
facturer, the measure of damages recoverable by the distributor is the
prospective net profits that could be realized during the reasonable
period of time which the contract should run. In determining what
constitutes a reasonable time, the trial court should consider the
distributor's preliminary and promotional expenditures ;10 the length
of time the distributorship has been in operation before the notice of
termination ;11 what the prospects for future profits are; and whether
the distributorship has proven profitable during its actual operation.
The amount of initial outlay and expenditures is not recoverable as
such, but is evidence for the jury to consider in determining whether
the distributor has had a reasonable time for performance under the
contract. The purpose of allowing a reasonable time for the contract
is to provide the distributor with a reasonable opportunity to recoup
his expenditures. But under the circumstances, if recoupment is
impossible, then he is not entitled to recover expenses as a separate
item of damages in his action against the manufacturer for breach.
Under the general rule, if the distributor would have had these
expenses if the contract had been fully performed, then he is not
entitled to recover them.'
2
'Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co., 368 Pa. 448, 84 A.2d 323 (1951);
Slonaker v. P. G. Pub. Co., 338 Pa. 292, 13 A.2d 48 (1940).' Note 2 supra; Jacks Cookie Co. v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1955).
'Fulghum v. Selma, 238 N.C. 100, 76 S.E.2d 368 (1953); Erskine v.
Chevrolet Motors Co., 185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706 (1923).
" The defendant offered testimony that he had expended $22,915.91 in
promoting the plaintiff's line of floor covering in the Carolinas." Snead v. Sutherland, 118 Vt. 361, 111 A.2d 335 (1955).
"Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chemical Co., 218 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1955);
Units Oil Ref. Co. v. Ledford, 125 Colo. 429, 244 P.2d 881 (1952); Gibbs
v. H. T. Henning Co., 189 Ga. 675, 7 S.E.2d 238 (1940) ; Mississippi Power
[Vol. 40
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The present case is to be distinguished from the earlier case
of Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co. 3 in which the court allowed the
distributor to recover not only the difference in the contract and
resale price of the cars, but also his initial outlay or preparatory
expenditures.14 In the principal case, while profits were allowed, the
court said that since the contract was not terminable at will, the
distributor could not recover initial expenses. This outlay was part
of the consideration for the contract, and to allow the distributor to
recover original expenses in addition to prospective profits would
permit him to obtain a double recovery.
The court, in the Erskine case, although not adhering to the
majority rule, suggested that where the manufacturer breaches a
distributor contract the distributor might recover on the basis of
either fraud 5 or quasi-contract. 16
The policy of allowing the distributor a reasonable period of
time in order that he may have the chance to recoup his expenditures
is equitable, because the distributor has generally spent a considerable
amount of money and time preparing for performance of the con-
tract. When the manufacturer breaches the contract, the distributor
should, at least, be placed in the same position as before the agree-
ment was made. BORDEN R. HALLOWES
& Light Co. v. Pitts, 181 Miss. 344, 179 So. 363 (1938); Platts v. Arnet, 50
Wash. 2d 42, 309 P.2d 372 (1957).
18 185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706 (1923). Here the plaintiff had contracted
with the defendant to be its agent to sell its cars. In reliance on the oral
promises of the defendant's manager, the plaintiff spent a considerable sum
in preparing for the performance of the contract. In addition he put in an
order for more cars than was the usual practice. After shipping only a few
cars to the plaintiff, the defendant repudiated the contract, and the plaintiff
sued for damages.
14 "It cannot well be assumed that the court intended that the outlay was
to be recovered in addition to profits. If the profits were to be taken as the
difference between the total sales during the period of the contract and the
purchase price of the automobiles to be sold with these expenses added, the
case would be different. If this probable net operating income was what
was meant by the court, the dictum is not contrary to the general rule."
Annot. 17 A.L.R.2d 1300, 1319 (1951).
15 If the distributor relies on the fraud theory, he must prove not only that
he relied on the representations of the manufacturer to his detriment, but
also that at the time the representations were made, the state of mind of the
manufacturer was such that he never intended to perform the contract.
Rudsill v. Whitner, 146 N.C. 403, 59 S.E. 995 (1907).
11 In the use of the quasi-contract theory, the distributor must show he
performed services or expended money upon the express or implied request
of the manufacturer. In such a case, the law will imply a promise on the
part of the manufacturer to pay for this benefit, and in this way prevent
unjust enrichment. Thompson v. Hunter's Ex'r, 269 S.W.2d 266 (Ky.
1954); Roper v. Clanton, 258 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. 1953).
1962]
